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Abstract
The allocation of credit by banks on ‘soft’ terms to friends and relatives - often termed
cronyism - rather than on the basis of ‘hard’ market criteria in the years leading up to the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98 has been hypothesized as an important cause of the crisis.
These practices had their basis in the implicit guarantees provided by the government to
banks, which in turn percolated down to ﬁrms having ‘crony’ ties to banks as soft-budget
constraints for projects of uncertain quality. Such soft-budget constraints should be reﬂected
in preferential access to long term bank credit for ﬁrms with close ties to banks. Using pre-
crisis data on borrowing patterns in Thailand we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with crony ties to banks and
politicians had greater access to long-term debt than ﬁrms without such ties. Surprisingly,
we ﬁnd that a broad range of standard ﬁrm characteristics suggested as important factors by
the literature on ﬁrm ﬁnance play a much less signiﬁcant role in explaining the allocation of
long term bank credit. Consequently, it is diﬃcult to avoid the interpretation that ‘cronyism’
was by far the main driver of pre-crisis lending patterns.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G30, G32
Keywords: Agency Costs, Corporate Governance, Crony Capital, Debt Maturity, East Asian
Financial Crisis, Thailand.1 Introduction
The Asian Crisis of 1997-98 has brought into sharp focus the distinctions between the relationship-
based economic and ﬁnancial system prevalent in many emerging economies and the arms-
length, market-driven system that mainly characterizes the developed economies of Western
Europe and North America. One inﬂuential view of the crisis (Krugman (1998), Corsetti et al.
(1998a), Pomerleano (1998)) goes as far as to suggest that the crisis had its origins in the al-
location of credit by banks and ﬁnancial institutions on ‘soft’ terms to friends and relatives -
often termed cronyism - rather than on the basis of ‘hard’ market criteria in the years leading
up to the crisis. But while cronyism has been anecdotally accepted as an endemic feature of
emerging economies, empirical work linking close ties to preferential ﬁnance is scant1. The goal
of this paper is to examine whether cronyism is in fact a good predictor of preferential access
to credit using a detailed dataset on Thai ﬁrms prior to the crisis period.
We believe our focus on corporate debt in Thailand is especially appropriate for the study of
cronyism in lending practices. Thailand was the ﬁrst casualty of the crisis, experiencing the ﬁrst
wave of serious speculative attacks on its currency in July of 1997 followed by a sharp decline
in its stock market, after which South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines were
aﬀected. Attempts to reconstruct the circumstances leading up to the crisis (such as Corsetti
et al. (1998a), Corsetti et al. (1998b), Pomerleano (1998)) argue this was not surprising since
Thailand was the country with the shakiest macro-economic fundamentals toward the end of
1996. Among the manifestations of weakness were large external deﬁcits, increasing short-term
foreign indebtedness and the fragile conditions of banks due to an accumulation of bad loans.
Discussions of cronyism in ﬁnance in the wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis suggest that
banks often extended preferential ﬁnance to projects of dubious quality promoted by their
friends or relatives because banks (or bankers) obtained private beneﬁts from such projects.
Such bank behavior is likely to have been ampliﬁed by implicit guarantees provided by the
government to bail out banks in the event of widespread project failure. While the government
would, of course, ideally like to avoid this ‘soft-budget constraint’ situation by monitoring banks
more strictly, if the institutions of corporate governance are poorly developed, as is often the
case in emerging economies (Johnson et al. (2000)), monitoring can be quite costly for the
government, and even if long-term ﬁnancing is prevented to non-crony ﬁrms, banks may still
1We discuss some of the recent related work below.
1ﬁnd it worthwhile to extend such ﬁnancing to crony ﬁrms. In section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the institutional environment of the Thai banking and ﬁnancial system prior to the
crisis that supports this view.
Standard economic reasoning suggests that if projects vary in their likelihood of success and
banks can discriminate in terms of the maturity of their debt contracts, then banks ought to
avoid extending long term ﬁnance to poor quality ﬁrms. However, the presence of such ‘crony’
transfers can overturn such results. We present a simple analytical argument along these lines
in section 3 in order to ground our empirical approach to the issue.
Our empirical methodology, which we describe in section 4, attempts to examine whether
ﬁrms with crony ties to banks have easier access to long term debt than ﬁrms without such ties.
We use a number of measures, such as aﬃliation to one of the 60 largest Thai business groups,
and the presence of bankers on the board of the ﬁrm and as executives in the ﬁrm as proxies
for ‘crony’ ties. We ﬁnd that these crony ties are by far the most important factor explaining
access to long term debt. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that a host of standard ﬁrm characteristics that
the current literature on ﬁrm ﬁnancing suggests should be important in explaining easier access
to debt play a much less signiﬁcant role. We suggest that these results lend support to the
hypothesis that cronyism was the most important factor determining access to long term bank
debt prior to the ﬁnancial crisis. Section 5 discusses these results.
Our paper is related to the growing literature that examines the impact of connections on
ﬁrm performance. The paper closest to our approach is La Porta et al. (2003). They examine
the beneﬁts of related lending using a newly assembled dataset on Mexico. They ﬁnd that
related lending is present in 20% of commercial loans and that it takes place on more favorable
terms than arms-length lending. They also ﬁnd that related loans are more likely to default,
and when they do, have signiﬁcantly lower recovery rates than unrelated loans. It is noteworthy
that our results for a diﬀerent emerging market, Thailand, are essentially consistent with theirs.
Related issues are also examined by Laeven (2001) using a dataset on bank-ﬁrm relationships
in Russia. Russian banks can make loans to ﬁrms that own substantial equity stakes in the
bank. His notion of cronyism is thus in terms of equity stakes and diﬀerent from the approach
we take here. In fact, as we discuss in more detail in section 5, lending to insiders in Thailand
is proscribed by the Commercial Banking and Finance Company Law. However, in line with
our study, he also ﬁnds evidence for cronyism is lending practices.
It is important to note that our study diﬀers from these papers in a number of substantive
2ways. First, we construct explicit measures based on membership to politically connected
business groups and ﬁrm-bank board interlinkage that we feel capture the essence of cronyism.
Second, since our study focusses on an economy that is in the shadow of the east asian crisis
of 1997-98, we examine the link between cronyism and debt maturity. As borrowing practices
have been implicated in precipitating the crisis, our study could be considered valuable in terms
of forensic ﬁnancial evidence toward understanding the crisis (Johnson et al. (2000)).
Recent papers by Fisman (2001) and Johnson and Mitton (2001) also examine the role of
political connections on ﬁrm performance in the context of emerging economies. Fisman (2001)
estimates the value of political connections in Indonesia by looking at how stock prices moved
when former President Suharto’s health was reported to change. Johnson and Mitton (2001)
examine the impact of connections in Malaysia by looking at the fall in the market value of
connected ﬁrms in the wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent reinstatement of
capital controls that diﬀerentially beneﬁted ﬁrms with connections. Both papers ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence for the value of connections.
Nor is the phenomenon restricted to emerging markets. Morck et al. (1998) show that
established, well-connected ﬁrms in Canada (as measured by family inheritance of control) are
less eﬃcient and had negative abnormal stock returns when the 1998 Canada-U.S. free trade
agreement reduced barriers to foreign capital.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section is a brief introduction to
the institutional background of the Thai banking system and its connected nature. Section 3
outlines a theoretical framework suggesting the way cronyism in ﬁnance aﬀects incentives and
decisions at the levels of the bank, ﬁrm and government. Section 4 describes our methodology
and data. Section 5 discusses our empirical results. Section 6 provides robustness tests. Section
7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background: The Thai Banking System
This section provides a brief overview of the Thai banking system prior to the 1997 ﬁnancial
crisis with a view toward highlighting the prevalence of crony ties between banks and ﬁrms
and some of the problems that could be associated with such relationships. Section 2.1 is an
outline of the historical development of the Thai banking system. Section 2.2 suggests the
existence of a ‘soft budget constraint’ at the next level of the institutional hierarchy, between
3the government and the banks, in the form of implicit guarantees to bail out banks if widespread
project failure were to occur. We should expect these practices to be manifested in the loan-
portfolio of the banks and Section 2.3 draws attention to the problem of non-performing loans
during this period that is consistent with such a view.
2.1 Background
The “Book Club” is the ﬁrst local commercial bank and was established in 1904. The bank
became the Siam Commercial Bank in 1906. The establishment of local banks grew rapidly
during the period 1930-1950 (Bualek (2000)). Out of 20 commercial banks that were established
during this period, 14 banks were founded by overseas Chinese families with the purpose of
chanelling funding to their own businesses2. The six remaining banks were founded by the
Crown Property Bureau3.
By the 1970s, the big banking families had expanded their banking businesses and had
established almost virtual control not only over other ﬁnancial institutions but also a wide
array of economic activities. For example, the Sophonpanich family not only owned the Bangkok
Bank, but also owned 34 ﬁnance and investment companies, 6 insurance companies, and had
large interests in rice trading, rice milling, warehousing, textiles, vehicle assembly, restaurants,
real estate, cement, tin, soft drinks, iron and steel, and plastics (Hewison (1989)). As a result,
these Thai-Chinese families not only controlled their own corporations, but also had substantial
inﬂuence over other corporations through their lending.
This expansion of ownership and control over the economy by the big banking and indus-
trial families exhibited a unique characteristic of Thai capitalism, namely the intertwining of
business and personal bonds through marriage. In part because of such bonds, the Thai ﬁnan-
cial system exhibited an increasingly oligopolistic structure. Within the commercial banking
sector, business became concentrated among the three largest banks, the Bangkok Bank, the
Thai Farmers Bank, and the government-owned Krung Thai Bank. By the end of 1986, these
three banks together accounted for 57 percent of total commercial bank assets.
2These families are Cholvicharn and Phenchart (Union Bank of Bangkok, 1949), Euachukiarti and Kanta-
manond (Bank of Asia, 1939), Euawatanaskul (Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, 1950), Kanchanapat (Siam City
Bank, 1941), First Bangkok City Bank, 1960), Lamsam (Thai Farmers Bank, 1945), Nandhabivat (Laemthong
Bank, 1948), Rattanarak (Bank of Ayudhya, 1945), Sophonpanich (Bangkok Bank, 1944), Tarnvanichkul (Asia
Trust Bank, 1965), Tejapaibul (Bank of Asia, 1939, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, 1950, and First Bangkok City
Bank, 1960), and Wang Lee (Nakornthon Bank, 1933).
3The Crown Property Bureau is the founder of the following banks: Siam Commercial Bank (1906), Siam City
Bank (1941), Krung Thai Bank (1966), Thai Dhanu Bank (1949), Nokornthon Bank (1933), and Thai Farmers
Bank (1945).
4Finance and securities companies constituted the second major group of ﬁnancial interme-
diaries. The ﬁrst full-ﬂedged ﬁnance company was established in 1969. The number of ﬁnance
companies grew rapidly during the 1970s from 17 in 1971 to 118 in 1979, when foreign and
local banks set up such companies to avoid the moratorium on new banking licenses imposed
by the Thai cabinet in mid 1970s, and to avoid the maximum interest rate and credit controls
imposed on commercial banks (Johnston (1991)). By the end of 1987, 26 out of the 93 ﬁnance
companies were aﬃliated with private Thai commercial banks, and a further 12 were aﬃliated
with the Krung Thai Bank.
By the end of 1996, the formal Thai ﬁnancial system consisted of the following ﬁnancial in-
termediaries: the Bank of Thailand (BOT); 29 commercial banks (14 of which were branches of
foreign banks); 91 ﬁnance companies; and 12 credit foncier companies; 7 specialized state-owned
banks; 15 insurance companies; 880 private provident funds; and 8 mutual fund management
companies. Sixteen commercial banks and 52 ﬁnance companies were listed in the Stock Ex-
change of Thailand, most of which were owned or controlled by family-based business groups.
Speciﬁcally, about 62.5 percent of banks and 75 percent of ﬁnance companies are controlled by
either a single family or multiple families (Anuchitworawong et al. (2002)).
Total assets of the system amounted to the equivalent of 190 percent of GDP. Commercial
banks alone accounted for 64 percent of total assets, while ﬁnance companies accounted for 20
percent of total assets, and state-owned specialized banks accounted for a further 10 percent.
2.2 Implicit Guarantees, Crony Lending, and Banking Crises
Extensive anecdotal evidence suggests that these inﬂuential families maintained banks and
ﬁnance companies as oﬀ-shoots of their businesses. Consequently, local Thai banks extended
loans based on personal ties and collateral but not on the basis of expected future cash-ﬂow.
On several instances these mis-allocated loans bankrupted the banks because the loans were
concentrated among only a few well connected inﬂuential families who eventually defaulted. For
example, Thanapornpun (1999) describes how in 1986 the Krung Thai bank allocated a large
amount of loans to the Srikrungwattana group, Pol Rengprasertwit and Sura Chansrichawala
families on preferential terms.
One of the most notorious cases concerns the lending practices of the Bangkok Bank of
Commerce (BBC), a medium sized bank, during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. The bank allegedly
granted a very large amount of loans to ﬁrms that were aﬃliated to Rajan Pillai, Rages Sakdina,
5Adnan Khashoggi and Suchat Thanchareon, who were close friends of the bank’s president and
major shareholder, Krirk-kiat Jalichandra. The bank collapsed in 1996 and the president was
not only dismissed but also charged by the Thai Economic Crime Suppression Division for
embezzling USD 66.3 million from the bank and extending huge loans beyond his authority.
The bank was subsequently recapitalized by the government. The BBC could be considered
the ﬁrst bank to succumb to problems arising from poor lending practices, a pattern that other
ﬁnancial institutions eventually displayed and which developed into the 1997 banking crisis.
Arguably, the principal reason why ﬁnancial institutions in Thailand felt comfortable en-
gaging in lending based on personal ties was their belief in the implicit guarantees provided
by the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to the eﬀect that they would be bailed out in the event of
ﬁnancial distress. Over the past two decades, these implicit guarantees were provided in several
forms. First, insolvent ﬁnancial institutions were often directly bailed out, a practice dating
from the latter half of 1980s until the onset of the 1997 crisis. The BOT rarely forced insolvent
ﬁnancial institutions to immediately cease operations even though lax lending practices by ﬁ-
nancial institutions on the basis of personal ties continued and has led to a number of crises
in the Thai ﬁnancial system over the past two decades. To facilitate the bail out policy, the
Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) was established in 1984. It’s brief has been to
rehabilitate and improve troubled ﬁnancial institutions and safeguard depositors and creditors.
Second, besides rescuing ﬁnancial institutions by providing liquidity support, the BOT has
always bailed out depositors and creditors. Even though Thailand never had an explicit deposit
insurance policy until 1997, when a blanket guarantee decree was issued, history reveals that
depositors were always protected (Wesaratchajakit (2002)). For example, during the banking
crisis in the mid of 1980s, depositors were compensated by the government in full. During the
1997 banking crisis, the FIDF also paid the creditors of the 56 failed ﬁnance companies. It is
widely thought that these practices created expectations that the government would bail out
the ﬁnancial system regardless of the costs.
Third, bank supervision and examination are poor. In addition, the BOT has punished nei-
ther ﬁnancial institutions nor executives for lending to risky projects that led to non-performing
loans. These issues are also acknowledged in the Nukul Commission Report4. According to
4This report is prepared for the government in 1998. The objective is to identify the causes of economic
and mis-management and corruption in the BOT. It provides recommendations to improve the eﬃciency of the
ﬁnancial system and reforms of the BOT. The chairman of the commission is Nukul Prachuabmoh, a former
governor of the BOT. Other members include the country’s leading economists and lawyers.
6the report on the BBC issue, the BOT failed to detect that the problems with non performing
loans since 1991 were serious and needed to be solved urgently. Hence, the BOT did not take
appropriate actions which should have included replacing the incumbent management of the
bank and reducing its capital. The BOT recognized the BBC problem when it was too late and
there was a run on bank deposits in 1996.
Fourth, the BOT not only bailed out ﬁnancial institutions in troubled times but also pro-
tected their status by concealing information, in particular on the non-performing loan prob-
lem, from the public (Thanapornpun (1999)). An interview in the Thai newspaper The Nation
(November 28, 1997) by Banthoon Lamsam, the president of the Thai Farmer’s Bank, which is
Thailand’s second largest bank, noted in Laird (2000) highlights this issue, and is reproduced
here.
“Financial institutions generating bad loans have never been punished because
the authorities and the institutions themselves swept the problems under the carpet.
In the past, the authorities were not transparent in the area of information collection,
and would conceal information from the public in order to protect (the institutions’)
status.”
Several cases of the BOT’s bail out of ﬁnancial institutions during 1980-1996 can be sum-
marized as follows. In 1984-1987, the BOT took over three banks, namely the Asian Trust
Bank, Siam City Bank, and Bangkok City Bank, that experienced serious liquidity problems,
and subsequently merged them with the government owned Krung Thai Bank. In 1993, there
was a run on First City Investment which is a ﬁnance company in the upper quartile of all
ﬁnance companies in asset and deposit size. The BOT took a USD 80,000 stake in the bank.
Three years later in 1996, there was a run on the Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) prompting
the BOT to inject USD 520,000 in exchange for a 32 percent stake of the bank. In 1997, the
FIDF further injected USD 26.12 million which is around 10 percent of GDP to shore up ﬁnance
companies5.
However, by the late summer of 1997, the Bank of Thailand found such bail-out promises
unsustainable and eventually 56 ﬁnance companies went bankrupt and were forced to close.
5The exchange rate was ﬁxed during the beginning of 1990s at USD 1= Baht 25.
72.3 Non-Performing Loans
One might argue that banks have incentives to provide more long term ﬁnancing to ﬁrms
that banks have close personal connections or board ties to because these connections help
limit information asymmetric and moral hazard problems. Thus connected lending should be
valuable both to the ﬁrms and banks. But, as noted also in La Porta et al. (2003), if lending to
friends whom the banks know well improves information ﬂows, then such lending should end up
having lower or no default rates, or at worst having high recovery rates. Unfortunately, due to
data unavailability, we are not able to directly provide a systematic analysis on this issue. But
we believe that the evidence on the massive amount of non performing loans carried by banks
and ﬁnance companies, and which subsequently bankrupted a number of them is inconsistent
with the information view and arguably supports the crony lending view.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the proportion of non performing loans (NPLs) to outstanding loans
over 1997-2000. NPL is deﬁned as a loan that has stopped payment on principal and interest for
at least 3 months. The laxity in lending practices is shown by the extremely high levels of NPLs.
The peak of the bad loan problems is in 1998 when the average ratio of NPL to outstanding
loans held by banks and ﬁnance companies were 45.02 percent and 70.16 percent, respectively.
It is widely believed, however, that the NPL ﬁgures tend to undermine the real problems. For
example, while NPLs disclosed by Krung Thai Bank, the second largest state owned bank, are
59 percent of outstanding loans, the ﬁgure that was estimated by Pricewaterhouse Coopers who
audited the bank is 84 percent (Bangkok Post, November 9, 1999).
The bad loan problem has been an important contributory factor to the banking crisis that
started in 1997. As a consequence of this crisis a number of ﬁnancial institutions became insol-
vent. Panel B provides the number of ﬁnancial institutions from 1996-2001. The government
suspended 58 ﬁnance companies in August 1997, 12 ﬁnance companies and six commercial banks
in 1998, and one commercial banks and one ﬁnance company in 1999. Consolidations including
mergers reduced the number of local commercial banks from 15 at the end of 1996 to 13 by
2001. In sum, out of 14 domestic banks as of 1996, three were closed down, two were taken over
by the government and three became foreign owned banks. As for ﬁnance companies, out of 91
companies as of 1996, 71 were closed down.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
83 The Model
In this section we present a simple and stylized version of the trade-oﬀ that a bank faces in
deciding whether to extend short-term or long term ﬁnancing to a ﬁrm. In an environment
consisting of ﬁrms that are heterogeneous in terms of their quality, we ﬁnd that, other things
being equal, a bank should extend long-term ﬁnancing only to high quality ﬁrms. However,
the introduction of cronyism can overturn this result. Furthermore, if we were to nest the
simple bank-ﬁrm interaction into a higher level interaction between the government and the
bank, the presence of soft-budget constraints can increase the likelihood of poor bank diligence
and consequently the need for bailouts of the bank by the government.
Firms
Our economy consists of a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs normalized to unity.
Each entrepreneur is the owner of a blueprint for an investment project that requires a capital
outlay of I for the purchase of productive assets. Entrepreneurs have no wealth and hence
have to rely on external ﬁnance from the bank. These assets can then be combined with
entrepreneurial eﬀort ¯ at a unit cost of 1 to produce a return on the investment. Assets are
purchased at date 0 and can be liquidated at date 1 (if the contract permits) for value L where
L · I. At date 2, these assets depreciate to value zero.
There are two possible states at date 1. The state can be good with probability q and
bad with probability (1 ¡ q): In the good state, the project pays out XS if it is terminated in
period 1. If a project in the good state runs till period 2 it pays out XL. We assume that
XL > XS > L:
Entrepreneurial eﬀort ¯ 2 [0;1) along with an exogenous quality parameter µ 2 [0;1]; aﬀect
the probability q of the good state occurring. We thus assume q = q(¯;µ) has the following
properties:




;q1(1;µ) = 0A2 (2)
q12(¯;µ) > 0A3 (3)
9where the subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the ﬁrst or second parameter,
respectively. A1 states that the probability of the good state being realized is increasing and
concave in eﬀort ¯ and is increasing in quality µ: A2 states that the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort
decreases to zero from a large number. A3 states that the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort is increasing
in entrepreneurial quality.
Banks
Banks choose to oﬀer one of two types of loan contracts to ﬁrms. One type of contract lasts
only one period, between periods 0 and 1, and is referred to as the short-term loan contract.
The other type of contract lasts two periods, between periods 0 and 2, and is referred to as the
long-term loan contract. Successful project returns are divided between the ﬁrm and the bank
in the exogenously given proportions ¹; and 1 ¡ ¹:
Information
Everyone knows quality at date 0. Once the project starts, the entrepreneur knows the
eﬀort exerted. The bank learns the eﬀort provided and the state at the same time as the owner.
Reservation payoﬀs are zero for all parties. Contracts have to be entered into at date 0 and no
renegotiation is possible mid-stream.
This framework sets up a very simple trade-oﬀ for the bank in terms of deciding whether
to extend short-term or long-term loans to the ﬁrm. Long-term loans have the attraction of
higher returns if successful but have the downside of no salvage value if unsuccessful. Short term
loans yield smaller gains if successful but have the beneﬁt of liquidation returns if unsuccessful.
We consider this trade-oﬀ for the bank in deciding whether to extend short-term or long-term
ﬁnancing to ﬁrms.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Short-term contracts
The payoﬀ for the bank is
ΠS
B = q(1 ¡ ¹)(XS ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ q)(I ¡ L) (4)
where the subscript denotes the player and the superscript denotes the maturity of the
contract. The payoﬀ for the ﬁrm is
ΠS
F = q¹XS ¡ ¯ (5)






which yields the eﬀort of the entrepreneur q¤
S(¯;µ):
Consequently the payoﬀ for the bank (4) can be written as
ΠS¤
B = q¤
S(1 ¡ ¹)(XS ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ q¤
S)(I ¡ L) (7)
Long-term contracts
The payoﬀ for the bank is
ΠL
B = q(1 ¡ ¹)(XL ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ q)I (8)
The payoﬀ for the ﬁrm is
ΠL
F = q¹XL ¡ ¯ (9)






which yields the eﬀort of the entrepreneur q¤
L(¯;µ):
Consequently the payoﬀ for the bank (8) can be written as
ΠL¤
B = q¤




1 , then by A1 it follows that q¤
L > q¤
S: In other words, regardless of ﬁrm type,
eﬀort is higher under long term contracts. However, the question of interest for us is how the
type of the ﬁrm should inﬂuence the bank in deciding whether to oﬀer long term or short term
contracts to a ﬁrm. In order to answer this consider the following diﬀerence between the payoﬀs




L(1 ¡ ¹)(XL ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ q¤
L)I ¡ q¤
S(1 ¡ ¹)(XS ¡ I) + (1 ¡ q¤
S)(I ¡ L) (12)





2L(1 ¡ ¹)(XL ¡ I) + q¤
2LI ¡ q¤
2S(1 ¡ ¹)(XS ¡ I) ¡ q¤
2S(I ¡ L) (13)
Using A3 and comparing terms in (13) it is easily observed that @D
@µ > 0: In other words, the
long-term versus short-term loan proﬁt diﬀerential for the bank is increasing in the quality of
the ﬁrm. Another way to understand the meaning of this is to start from a situation where the
bank is indiﬀerent between each type of loan, i.e., D = 0. Even a small improvement in ﬁrm
quality proﬁt from this point should lead the bank to favor long- term loans. And conversely, a
small reduction in ﬁrm quality from this point should lead the bank to favor short-term loans.
With an eye toward our empirical strategy we summarize this discussion follows.
Result 1: Firm quality should be an important determinant of loan maturity. Ceteris
paribus, the bank should provide long term loans only to high quality ﬁrms while low quality
ﬁrms should only be able to obtain short term loans.
Cronyism
This result can be overturned through the introduction of cronyism. A simple way to
incorporate cronyism of the kind we have in mind into this framework is by assuming that a
low quality ﬁrm which has crony ties to the bank pays a ‘kickback’ of ® to the bank in period
0 in exchange for obtaining a long-term loan. It is easy to see that if ® is large enough it can
overturn the sign of D and thus lead the bank to agree to make such a loan even though the ﬁrm
is of low quality. Again, with a view toward our empirical strategy we state this implication
separately as follows.
Result 2: In the presence of cronyism, ﬁrm quality may be disregarded in determining of
loan maturity. In such an environment the bank may provide long term loans to poor quality
ﬁrms.
Soft Budget Constraints
Even though the bank ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to make loans to low quality ﬁrms with which it has
crony ties, since these are low quality ﬁrms, there is still a signiﬁcant chance that the project
will fail. The introduction of cronyism thus increases the probability of poor outcomes and the
consequent need for bank bailouts. But if banks expect the government to bail them out in the
event of ﬁnancial distress then such practices will not have adverse consequences for the bank.
12Thus, a soft-budget constraint at the government-bank level, implying that the government will
bail-out the bank in the event of ﬁnancial distress caused by long-term loans to poor quality
projects, can ﬁlter down to the next level encouraging lax banking practices. This in turn will
increase the likelihood of the poor outcome on the part of the ﬁrm. This could be formalized
by grafting a game between the government and the bank on top of the game between the bank
and the entrepreneur. Since this idea has been developed by the recent literature on the soft-
budget constraint (SBC) problem of transition economies (see Dewatripont and Maskin (1995),
Mitchell (1997), and Berglof and Roland (1998)) we do not reproduce the analytical details of
the argument but recommend them to the interested reader.
4 Data and Empirical methods
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Characteristics
Our empirical strategy is geared toward investigating whether connections to ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries aﬀect the likelihood of access to preferential sources of long term loans. Our sample
contains data on 270 non-ﬁnancial companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996.
The data were collected from multiple sources. Our main source of data is the Stock Exchange
of Thailand. The database obtained directly from the Stock Exchange of Thailand is a compre-
hensive database which contains data on balance sheet and income statements for individual
consolidated companies, equity ownership for both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial companies and
the board of directors.
This study is based on a unique database of ownership structure that enables us to trace ul-
timate ownership. The information used to trace the ultimate shareholders of private companies
as well as family relationships between the major shareholders beyond their surnames is ob-
tained from Document 56-1, which is available at the library of the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
It contains detailed company information required for public disclosure by the Stock Exchange
of Thailand. In addition, we have used the Business On Line (BOL) database published by the
Business On Line Co., Ltd. to trace the ownership of private companies that is not disclosed
in Document 56-1. This database contains the ownership of all limited companies in Thailand
that were registered with the Ministry of Commerce. The BOL collected this information from
the company’s annual reports from the Ministry of Commerce ﬁlings.
Additional references for ownership structure and family relationships, especially those af-
13ﬁliated with big business groups are obtained from Manager Information Services (1996) and
Brooker-Group (2002).
Our sample accounts for 97.08 percent of the market value of all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The
characteristics of the companies in the sample are presented in Table 2. Panel A shows the
number of companies in the sample classiﬁed by industry. The industry groupings follow the
classiﬁcation of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for
companies in the sample. In general, companies in the sample are not just small or start-up
companies. The average number of years since a ﬁrm was set up is 21.02 years. The sample
includes both large companies and smaller size companies. The book value of total assets
varies from a maximum of 179,785 million Baht (7191.40 million USD) to a minimum of 325.82
million Baht (13.03 million USD), with mean and median values of 7,140.71 million Baht (285.63
million USD) and 2,428.76 million Baht (97.15 million USD), respectively. Sales revenues and
the market value of equity present a similar picture.
The ranking of companies in Thailand, published by Management Information Service
(1996b) shows that this sample also includes large companies in Thailand.6 Speciﬁcally, 22
companies in our sample appear in the 100 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. About
35.56 percent of companies in the sample are among the largest 500 companies in Thailand.
Approximately 77.78 percent of our sample or 210 companies are in the top 2000 companies.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
4.2 Empirical Methods
In order to examine whether strong connections with banks and ﬁnance companies provide
ﬁrms preferential access to long term loans, we use the standard corporate ﬁnance model of the
determinants of debt maturity following Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996)
and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). Speciﬁcally, we estimate a measure of long term
loans as a function of measures of crony relationship and control variables. As a proxy for long
term loans, we use the ratio of long term borrowings from banks and ﬁnance companies to
total debt. Total debt includes short term and long term debt from banks and other ﬁnancial
intermediaries, long term debt that is due in the current period, and debentures.
6Management Information Service (1996b) lists the 2000 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. The ranking
includes both publicly traded and private companies. This source of information is used because there is no
similar information available for 1996, and it is the closest data available to 1996. The rankings based on 1994
data probably do not provide exact information for the companies in our sample. Nevertheless, the rankings do
help to understand the characteristics of companies in our sample.
144.2.1 Crony relationship with banks
We analyze the scope of ﬁrm-bank connections that are established through the following two
methods: Crony relationship, and the board of directors. Hereafter we use the word ‘bank’ as
an abbreviation for ﬁnancial institutions. It includes both banks and ﬁnance companies. We
deﬁne a ﬁrm as being ‘crony connected’ to banks when the ﬁrm is owned by the country’s most
inﬂuential families. In other words, we believe that the country’s most inﬂuential families are
not only closely connected to each other but also to families that control banks7. As several
authors have noted (Khanna (2000), Bongini et al. (2000) Chui et al. (2000) and (Fisman
2001)) in emerging market contexts, a country’s inﬂuential families are known to be strongly
connected to not only ﬁnancial institutions but also the power structure . Thailand certainly is
not an exception.
Close ties to banks beneﬁt ﬁrms in several ways. For example, the strong relationships
with banks often provide preferential treatment and easier access to funding. Weinstein and
Yafeh (1998) ﬁnd that Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms with strong bank relationships during the
period 1977-86 tended to use more capital than independent ﬁrms in the same industry when
their operating cash ﬂow declined. There is extensive anecdotal evidence that strong ties with
banks enable ﬁrms connected to inﬂuential families in Thailand to receive funding easily (see
Section 2).
Close ties to banks also provide opportunities for ﬁrms to obtain economic rents created by
various regulations. In many emerging economies, the government encourages banks to lend to
big business groups or speciﬁc industries, such as in export oriented sectors. For example, in
Thailand banks were dictated to provide lower than the market rate loans to the agri-business
industry in the 1980s. Anecdotal evidence exists of ﬁrms with close ties with banks receiving
most of these loans. In Korea until the end of the 1980s, banks were dictated by the government
to lend to large family-owned business groups (Chaebols) at low interest rates. Lee et al. (1999)
ﬁnd that Chaebol aﬃliated ﬁrms are in fact more levered than stand alone ﬁrms.
The close ties that inﬂuential families have with politicians and bureaucrats are valuable
to the controlling families since the ties lead to favorable treatment when they have ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. In Korea, the government has bailed out ﬁnancially distressed Chaebol (Lee et al.
7It is worth noted here that although in Thailand cronyism is founded on the linkages between the wealthy
and inﬂuential families, bureaucrats, and politicians, the center of the cronyism is families that own banks or
ﬁnance companies. This characteristics is, however, diﬀerent from that of other Asian countries , e.g., Malaysia
and Indonesia where the focus are the presidency.
15(1999) and (Joh 2002)).
We deﬁne a family as being “inﬂuential” by their wealth. Similar to many emerging
economies, in Thailand there is no oﬃcial record on the ranking of business groups. We use
the ranking of group ﬁrms in Thailand done by Suehiro (2000) to identify the country’s most
inﬂuential families. Suehiro ranks the families by summing up sales of their ﬁrms that appear
in the largest thousand ﬁrms in 1994. For information on company aﬃliations, he uses Tara
Siam Business Information (1996) and the database compiled from the Ministry of Commerce.
For the ‘inﬂuential families’ to be a good indicator of the strong connections with banks,
the proxy for the ‘inﬂuential families’ should include the most well known and wealthy families.
Accordingly, we deﬁne ‘inﬂuential families’ to be the owners of the 60 largest business groups8.
The choice of 60 is arbitrary, however. The size of these business groups, measured by sales,
ranges from 122, 039 million Baht to 6,241 million Baht (Suehiro (2000)).
We deﬁne ﬁrms as connected to these inﬂuential families if any of these families own at
least a 10 percent stake in the ﬁrms 9. As shown by the family names, business groups not
only proxy strong political connections but also the close ties that the big business groups
have with banks and ﬁnance companies. Our results show that 96 ﬁrms or 35.56 percent of
ﬁrms in our sample are aﬃliated to these connected families. Among these families, the Crown
Property Bureau, Lamsam, Rattanarak, Sophonpanit, Taechaphibun, and Wang Lee own and
control banks, ﬁnance and insurance companies. In fact, they are also the founders of the
banks. Except for the Crown Property Bureau, the controlling families of these banks have
been involved in management as top executives. There are 31 ﬁrms which account for 11.48
percent of the sample where the controlling shareholders are the major shareholders of banks
and ﬁnance companies (Table 3).
With respect to the connections with banks via the board of directors, we deﬁne the board
connections in a similar manner to Kroszner and Strahan (2001a). Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm has
8These groups are owned by the following prominent families: Asakun, Assawaphokin, Bencharongkun, Bod-
harmik, Boonnamsap, Bulakul, Buraphachaisiri, Charnsiri, Charnwirakun, Chiarawanon, Chirathiwat, Choke
Wattana, Chonwicharn, Chungrungruenkit, Chaiyawan, Chuturakun, the Crown Property Bureau, Darakanon,
Damnoencharnwanit, Horruagruang, Kannasut, Khachanapat, Khanathanawanit, Konutakiat, Krisdathanont,
Laohathai, Lamsam, Liaophairat, Lee-issaranukun, Lee-nutapong, Lee-sawattrakun, Osathanukhro, Phenchart,
Pornprapha, Photirattanangkun, Phiromphakdi, Rattanarak, Sarasin, Sirimongkonkasem, Sophonpanit, Siriwat-
tanapakdi, Srifuengfung, Sriwikorn, Suoson, Taechaphibun, Taephaisitphong, Tangmatitham, Thienprasidda,
Uachukiat, Umput Wang Lee, Wiriyaprapaikit, Wattanawekin, Wiriyaphan, and Wongkusolkit.
9According to the Thai corporate law, with this level of shareholdings, a shareholder can control the ﬁrm in
the following manner. He has the right to submit a motion to the court for the company’s liquidation if, ( i.)
management fails to act in accordance with the provisions relating to payments of stock issuance and transferring
of ownership, (ii.) the number of shareholders is less than 15, and (iii.) the company is in ﬁnancial distress and
has no possibility of recovering (see Stock Exchange of Thailand (1997) and Wiwattanakantang (2001b)).
16connections with the bank board when at least one member of the ﬁrm’s board serves on the
boards of banks and ﬁnance companies or vice versa. Out of 270 ﬁrms in the sample, 186 ﬁrms
or 68.89 percent of the sample have at least one incidence of the board connection with those
of banks (Table 3). On average, these ﬁrms have connections with 1.79 banks, and the median
number of banks that the ﬁrms connected with is two.
We investigate further in order to examine the close relationships with banks that are eﬀected
through board representation at diﬀerent management levels. Our focus is on two management
levels, namely executives and non executives. An executive is deﬁned as someone who holds
one of the following positions: chairman, honorary chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-
president, CEO or managing director, vice-CEO and vice managing director. Non-executives
are other directors of the board.
Our results reveal that the board connection appears to be most frequent at the non-
executive level, which accounts for about 36.30 percent of the ﬁrms. In 13 ﬁrms which accounts
for 4.81 percent of our sample, the ﬁrm’s board is connected with those of banks at the exec-
utives level. Finally, in about 28.15 percent of the ﬁrms, the board connections are via both
the executive and non executive levels. We expect that top managers who are at the same time
serving at the boards of banks are likely to make it easier for their companies to get long term
loans.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
4.2.2 Control variables
Previous studies suggest since it is diﬃcult to monitor ﬁrms due to a high degree of information
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, investors are likely to depend more on short term
loans (Barclay and Smith (1995), Houston and James (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996)).
Diamond (1991a) argues that low quality ﬁrms that have insuﬃcient cash ﬂows have no choice
but to resort to short term debt. These ﬁrms are discouraged from using long term debt because
they have low credit ratings, and hence bear higher interest costs. As low rated ﬁrms are not
able to participate in the directly placed long-term debt market, they end up borrowing short
term from intermediaries such as banks and ﬁnance companies.
From the creditor side, short-term ﬁnancing facilitates monitoring by creditors. With a
short-term loan contract, banks can review the ﬁrms decisions more frequently and, if necessary,
17vary the terms of ﬁnancing or liquidate the project before suﬃcient losses have accumulated to
make default by the borrower optimal (Diamond (1991b) and Rajan (1992)). With a short-term
loan contract, banks gain a degree of control and can maintain a stronger bargaining position
when renewing the loan contracts (Rajan (1992)). By having the power to withdraw continued
ﬁnancing, banks can inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s management decisions over investment policy. Also,
shorter maturities limit the period over which an opportunistic ﬁrm can exploit its creditors
without defaulting. In the worse case, with short term debt, banks can pull their capital out at
any indication of trouble (Diamond and Rajan (2000)).
Following the literature, we include ﬁve variables to control for ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics.
First, we include the natural logarithm of assets (Log (assets)) as a measure of ﬁrm size. Size
might be positively associated with reputation as well as the level of the ﬁrm speciﬁc information
that is disclosed to public (Diamond (1991b)). Also, larger ﬁrms are likely to be more diversiﬁed
and hence have less chance of going into ﬁnancial distress than smaller ﬁrms. Further, larger
ﬁrms tend to have easier access to other ﬁnancial markets and institutions (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999)). Accordingly, ﬁrm size is likely to be positively correlated with the level of
long term debt.
Second, we include the ratio of the market to the book value of total assets (M-B ratio)
as a proxy for future investment opportunities. The literature on debt maturity suggests that
ﬁrms with high growth prospects are susceptible to both under and over investment problems.
Short term debt might mitigate these problems since the debt contract comes up for negotiation
before completion of the projects. Hence the creditors can monitor the operation and investment
decisions of the ﬁrms. Thus we predict a negative relation between growth opportunities and
long term debt.
Third, we also include the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets (Fixed asset ratio) in the
model to capture the eﬀect of collateral on the use of long term loans. The ﬁxed asset ratio
can also be used to control for the maturity matching eﬀect on ﬁnancial structure. Stohs and
Mauer (1996) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that ﬁrms are more likely to
choose debt maturity in order to match the maturity of borrowing with the maturity of their
assets. Therefore, ﬁrms tend to need more long term funding to ﬁnance their investment in
ﬁxed assets.
Fourth, we include the standard deviation of the percentage changes in sales over the period
1991-1995 (S.D. (sales 1992-95) to control for the volatility of earning. The volatility of earning
18is positively related to the level of the asymmetric information problem the ﬁrm faces when
trying to acquire long term loans. We expect that higher risk ﬁrms are likely to have diﬃculty
obtaining long term debt.
Finally, we include a measure of leverage deﬁned as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets to control for the probability of being in ﬁnancial distress. Firms with high probability
of default are likely to have a greater likelihood of ﬁnancial troubles. These high default risk
ﬁrms are likely to be have diﬃculty obtaining long term debt since creditors would require high
interest rates for bearing the long term credit risk.
To capture the variation in borrowing decisions due to industry characteristics, we include
21 dummy variables. These 21 dummies represent ﬁrms in the 21 industries that are described
in section 4.1. The remaining industry is the agribusiness industry.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 4 and Table 5 provide comparisons of mean and median values of ﬁnancing structure
and ﬁrms characteristics between ﬁrms with and without bank connections. Table 4 presents
comparison between ﬁrms that are connected to the inﬂuential families and those that are
not. Table 5 shows the comparison between ﬁrms that are connected to banks and ﬁnance
companies through their boards of directors. As hypothesized, connected ﬁrms tend to have
relatively more long term loans relative to non connected ﬁrms. Connected ﬁrms, however,
appear to have signiﬁcantly less short term loans when compared to non connected ﬁrms. As
a result, both connected and non connected ﬁrms turn out to be similar in using overall debt.
The mean and median values of total debt to asset ratios for both connected and non connected
ﬁrms are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
We investigate further by testing whether diﬀerences in the use of long term loans between
crony and non crony ﬁrms are attributable to the diﬀerences in the ﬁrm characteristics factors.
Except that connected ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly larger measured by assets and sales, connected
and non-connected ﬁrms appear to be similar in terms of proﬁtability, tangible assets, growth,
and leverage. In other words, connected ﬁrms do not appear to be more proﬁtable, have less
tangible assets and are not less ﬁnancially risky than non connected ﬁrms. Our results are
in fact in line with La Porta et al. (2003) on Mexican ﬁrms. This preliminary investigation
19provides some support for our conjecture that close relationships with ﬁnancial institutions do
matter in facilitating more long term lending. In the next section, we investigate this issue in
more detail using multivariate analysis.
[Insert Table 4 here]
[Insert Table 5 Here]
5.2 Crony Relationships and Long Term Loans
We ﬁrst analyze whether ﬁrms with close ties to banks and ﬁnance companies obtain relatively
more long term loans. Table 6 contains the OLS regression results of the investigation on
the eﬀects of crony ties with banks measured by business groups on long term lending. In
Speciﬁcation (1), we present the regression results for all ﬁrms that are aﬃliated to the 60
inﬂuential families which is indicated by a dummy variable Connected to inﬂuential families.
The dummy variable is one if the ﬁrm is owned by the 60 inﬂuential families documented in
Section 4.2.1. The empirical evidence strongly supports the crony hypothesis that the close
ties of personal and political favoritism provide greater access to long term borrowing from
banks and ﬁnance companies. The coeﬃcient estimates on Inﬂuential families are signiﬁcantly
positive at the 5 percent level.
As discussed earlier, a number of these inﬂuential families also own banks and ﬁnance
companies. In order to investigate only the eﬀects of crony relationships, we need to eliminate
the ownership eﬀects. We rerun the regressions and include two dummy variables that sepa-
rately capture the ownership and the crony eﬀects namely Inﬂuential families with banks and
Inﬂuential families without banks. Inﬂuential families with banks indicates if the ﬁrm’s major
shareholder also owns at least one bank and ﬁnance company. Inﬂuential families without banks
indicates if the ﬁrm’s major shareholder does not own at least one bank and ﬁnance company.
Results are shown in Speciﬁcation (2).
The results show that all else being equal, aﬃliates of the inﬂuential families that are not
the owners of banks access signiﬁcantly more long term bank debt. This evidence implies that
aﬃliates of the inﬂuential families probably beneﬁt from their owners’ connections with banks
and ﬁnance companies. Surprisingly, ﬁrms aﬃliated to the inﬂuential families who control banks
and ﬁnance companies and were widely thought of as being in a better position to get more
loans do not appear to use more long term debt. In contrast, our ﬁndings suggest that owning
20banks and ﬁnance companies does not make it easier for the owners to access more long term
loans. This evidence is diﬀerent from the Russian case as documented in Laeven (2001). A
contributory factor to this ﬁndings would be the regulation on bank lending. Banks and ﬁnance
companies are prevented from lending to the insiders by the Commercial Banking and Finance
Company Law. Insider lending also includes lending to ﬁrms that are owned by insiders to the
extent of more than 30 percent. Since these families own relatively concentrated shareholdings
in their aﬃliated ﬁrms, lending to these ﬁrms would certainly violate the law. Besides, such
lending practices can easily be checked since these ﬁrms are publicly traded.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Regarding the eﬀects of ﬁrm characteristics on the choices of long term borrowing, we ﬁnd
weak support for the hypothesis that ﬁrms with high agency costs are likely to use less long
term bank debt. Somewhat surprisingly, the coeﬃcient estimates associated with only two ﬁrm
characteristics factors are signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on ﬁrm size and the ﬁxed asset ratio
are consistently signiﬁcant at the conventional levels in all models. Other ﬁrm characteristics,
however, are consistently insigniﬁcant.
These results indicate that ﬁrm size and type of assets do matter in extending debt maturity.
Large ﬁrms have more access to long term loans probably because they have smaller information
asymmetries or are more diversiﬁed. The results also suggest that ﬁrms may use their tangible
assets as collateral to support long term loans.
However, besides size and tangible assets, other ﬁrm characteristics that are usually found to
be empirically important determinants of debt maturity structure in more developed economies
such as the U.S. do not appear to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on long term borrowing of Thai
ﬁrms.
5.2.1 How do crony relationships increase long term Loan?
In this section, we investigate how crony relationships work to enable ﬁrms to raise more long
term loans. More precisely, we analyze whether the crony relationships overwhelm the eﬀects of
ﬁrm characteristics on the decisions of long term loans. For example, the debt maturity literature
suggests that ﬁrms should match the maturity structures of their assets and ﬁnancing, hence
ﬁrms with less ﬁxed assets should be associated with less long term loans. However, the ﬁxed
asset eﬀect on the choices of long term loans might be attenuated or disappear if ﬁrms have
21strong connections with banks. In this section, we attempt to shed light on these issues.
To test this issue, we need to simultaneously incorporate crony and ﬁrm characteristic vari-
ables. We re-estimate the regressions including the interaction terms between ﬁrm-bank con-
nection variables and ﬁrm characteristics. The coeﬃcient on a given interaction term measures
how the relation between the choice of long term debt and the relevant ﬁrm characteristic diﬀers
for ﬁrms with and without close connections. If the crony relationships overwhelm the eﬀects
of ﬁrm characteristics on the decisions of long term loans, then the estimated coeﬃcient on an
interaction variable for a ﬁrm characteristic should be opposite in sign from the non-interaction
term.
The results of the regression are presented in Table 7. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the
ﬁrm characteristics are interacted with Inﬂuential families, Inﬂuential families with banks, and
Inﬂuential families without banks. Overall, the results provide stronger support for the crony
lending hypothesis. While the coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed asset ratio are positive and consistently
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in all regressions, the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction
terms between the ﬁxed asset ratio and the dummy variables indicating the eﬀects of the inﬂu-
ential families turn out to be signiﬁcantly negative in Speciﬁcation (1) and (3) (insigniﬁcant in
Speciﬁcation (2)). This evidence suggests that long term loans to non crony ﬁrms are always
collateralized. This practice, however, does not apply for inﬂuential families, especially those
who do not control banks. This ﬁnding is in line with the Mexican banks’ lending practices
found in La Porta et al. (2003).
These results could also suggest a diﬀerent interpretation along the following lines. Firms
owned by the inﬂuential families appear to misuse long term loans. Instead of being used to
ﬁnance ﬁxed assets as suggested, long term loan are used to ﬁnance short term assets in the
ﬁrms that belong to the inﬂuential families that do not own banks.
The results of Speciﬁcation (2), that show the eﬀects of inﬂuential families that control
ﬁnancial institutions are also interesting. While default probability, measured by the liability
to asset ratio, has no signiﬁcant impact on the choice of long term debt for non crony ﬁrms,
default probability does have positive eﬀects in the case of ﬁrms connected to the inﬂuential
families with ownership of banks. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term between the crony
ﬁrm dummy and the liability to asset ratio is strongly signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. However
this is not the case for the ﬁrms connected to the inﬂuential families that do not control banks
(Speciﬁcation (3)).
22Theoretically, ﬁrms with high default risk have incentives to use more long term loans to
help them avoid being liquidated (Diamond (1991b)). Creditors, however, try to avoid lending
to these ﬁrms. However, our results suggest that ﬁrms aﬃliated to the inﬂuential families that
own banks appear to be able to use more long term debt despite facing a higher probability of
being in ﬁnancial troubles. The inﬂuential families might be able to direct toward themselves
more long term loans probably because of the power that comes from controlling banks and
ﬁnance companies.
Speciﬁcation (2) also shows that among ﬁrms aﬃliated with the inﬂuential families that
own banks, there is a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between the proportion of long term
lending and M-B ratio. We are not sure how to interpret this result. However it is inconsistent
with the argument that close ties with banks established via both share and debt holdings
mitigate the agency costs of debt as in Japan and the US. If banks do play an active role in
corporate governance, a positive relationship between the measure of growth opportunities and
the reliance of long term loans is expected. This is in fact the case in the US ﬁrms documented
in Houston and James (1996).
[Insert Table 7 Here]
5.3 Board Connections and Long Term Loans
We explore how board connections aﬀect long term lending in Table 8. Speciﬁcation (1) focuses
on the eﬀect of the presence of any board connections between ﬁrms and banks. The ratio of
number of positions on the board that are connected with banks to board size (Board connec-
tions/board size) captures this eﬀect. The estimated coeﬃcient on Board connections/board size
is positive as expected and strongly signiﬁcant.
We separate the board connections into three categories: Connections at the executive,
non executive and both executive, non executive levels. The results in speciﬁcation (2) show
that preferential access to long term loans to ﬁrms appears only when ﬁrms have strong board
connections with banks meaning that the connections have to be through both the executive
and non executive levels.
We investigate further whether the positive relationship between board connections and
the ratio of long term loans remains if we exclude ﬁrms that share common ultimate owners
with banks. By excluding ﬁrms where their controlling shareholders own banks and ﬁnance
23companies, we are able to separate the eﬀects of the crony relationship from the eﬀects of
the bank ownership. We repeat the regressions in Speciﬁcation (1) and (2) but exclude 36
ﬁrms in which the major shareholders own ﬁnancial institutions. The results are reported in
Speciﬁcation (3) and (4). Consistent with the previous ﬁndings, the results suggest that board
connections both via executive and non executive levels are indeed beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms. The
connected ﬁrms seem to be able to obtain more long term loans.
To understand whether the board connections aﬀect the long term lending practices via
ﬁrm characteristics, we ran regressions using similar methodology in Table 7. None of the
estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms between the board connection variables and the
ﬁrm characteristics appears to be statistically signiﬁcant, however.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
6 Robustness Tests: The Determinants of Board Connections
To test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we investigate factors that determine the allocation of
board connections. This is in order to determine whether the presence of board connections
is a reﬂection of agency cost problems or is due to crony relationships. If the crony relation-
ship aﬀects the establishment of the board connections with banks, then our board connection
variable is indeed a good proxy for the crony relationship.
Kroszner and Strahan (2001b) argue that the board connections might generate conﬂicts of
interests between creditors and borrowing ﬁrms especially when the ﬁrms are facing ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. The basic statement of this view is that when the ﬁrms experience ﬁnancial distress,
either bankers who are sitting on the ﬁrms’ boards or directors of the borrowing ﬁrms who are
sitting on the banks’ boards tend to act on behalf of the ﬁrms. They are likely to put pressure on
banks to provide more loans to the ﬁrm. Since lending to troubled ﬁrms have a high probability
of default, these lending practices may in turn bankrupt the banks. Hence, banks are less likely
to have connections with unstable ﬁrms and more likely to establish connections with ﬁrms for
whom the potential for conﬂicts is low. These ﬁrms are larger ﬁrms, with more tangible assets,
are more stable in term of proﬁtability, and have less leverage.
In contrast, the information view provides the opposite prediction. The ﬁrm-bank relation-
ship literature suggests that banks can learn a substantial amount of information about their
ﬁrm-customers via board representation. Besides, by sitting in a ﬁrm’s board, banks might
24be able to closely monitor the behavior of ﬁrm management and may even inﬂuence decisions
made by the management. Since banks have such a wide access to private information about
the ﬁrms, the information asymmetries as well as the moral hazard problem might be mitigated.
Hence, this information view suggests that the beneﬁts of board connections from both the ﬁrm
and bank point of views depends on the potential information asymmetries and the agency
costs of debt ﬁnancing between the ﬁrms and banks. Consistent with this view, ﬁrms that have
high agency costs and are diﬃcult to monitor should have connections with banks. That is,
smaller ﬁrms, ﬁrms with a lower proportion of tangible assets and less stable ﬁrms with stable
proﬁtability and higher fractions of leverage ratio are expected to be more likely to have the
board connections with banks.
The crony view, however, leads to a diﬀerent prediction. If the banking system is protected
by implicit guarantees that provide insurance for banks from going bankrupt, the conﬂicts of
interests between banks and borrowing ﬁrms might be softened. Fully recognizing that the
government bears the costs of any ﬁnancial distress, banks may build board connections with
ﬁrms that are owned by their families and friends. In the extreme case, the connections might
be established irrespective of ﬁrm characteristic factors. In other words, the crony view suggests
that the crony relationships might overwhelm the eﬀect of ﬁrm characteristics.
To explore this issue systematically, we follow the methodology used by Kroszner and Stra-
han (2001a and 2001b). We use a probit model in which the dependent variable is one if the
ﬁrm has at least one person on its board serving on a bank’s board or if the ﬁrm has a banker
on its board. The probit regression results on the determinants of the incidence of the board
connections are shown in Table 9. In Speciﬁcation (1), we test how board connections vary
with ﬁrm characteristics. The ﬁrm characteristics are the same set of variables described in
Section 4.2. The reported results are the marginal eﬀects of a one unit change from the mean
of each independent variable on the probability of having a board connection with banks.
Our results are partially in line with those of Kroszner and Strahan (2001a and 2001b).
Similar to the US banks, Thai banks also have the connections with larger ﬁrms. However,
unlike the US, asset tangibility, growth and sale volatility are not related to the probability of
having board connections. In addition, the connections are more prevalent for less indebted
ﬁrms. Overall, these results somewhat support the conﬂict of interest argument and reject the
information view.
Next, we investigate whether the existence of crony relationships as well as ownership of
25banks contributes to the incidence of board connections. In Speciﬁcation (2), we include two
dummies representing ﬁrms that are owned by the two groups of the inﬂuential families: In-
ﬂuential families with bank and Inﬂuential families without bank. The estimated coeﬃcients of
these two dummy variables are strongly signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The results show
that connections are most prevalent among crony ﬁrms aﬃliated to these two groups of inﬂu-
ential families. Further investigation on the data reveals that out of 65 ﬁrms that belong to the
inﬂuential families that do not own banks, only 6 ﬁrms do not have a board connection. Firms
that belong to the inﬂuential families who also own banks, however, are always connected to
the boards of banks. In most of the cases, the persons who serve on the boards of banks and
ﬁrms are the ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders and their families.
Interestingly, once we control for the eﬀects of crony relationships by including the two
proxies of inﬂuential families, the incidence of board connections is hardly related to ﬁrm char-
acteristics. Except the measure for ﬁrm’s size, none of the estimated coeﬃcients on the rest of
the ﬁrm characteristics turn out to be statistically distinguishable from zero. These results are
consistent with the crony view, and do not appear to support the information view.
We investigate further to check whether the eﬀects of ﬁrm characteristics on the likelihood of
having the board connections is attenuated for the case of crony ﬁrms. To absolutely distinguish
the ownership eﬀect from the crony eﬀect, we examine ﬁrms that are aﬃliated to the inﬂuential
families that do not own banks. We interact the variable Inﬂuential families without bank with
the ﬁve ﬁrm characteristics. The results in Speciﬁcation (3) show that when banks build a
connection with non crony ﬁrms, banks appear to have board connections with larger ﬁrms. In
contrast, banks seem to pay less attention to ﬁrm’s size when they establish a connection with
the crony ﬁrms. Banks appear to have connections with ﬁrms that are owned by inﬂuential
families even if they are smaller.
To test the robustness of this ﬁndings, we drop 31 ﬁrms that are owned by the inﬂuential
families that own banks from our sample and re-estimate the probit model. Our results remain
the same (Speciﬁcation (4) and (5)). In an unreported regression, we ran a test that controls
for the size of the board. The regression was done by using the Tobit model, in which the
dependent variable is the ratio of the number of persons from a ﬁrm’s board who are serving on
the boards of banks divided by the number of persons in the ﬁrm’s board. Again, our results
are robust in term of signs, statistical signiﬁcance and magnitudes.
26[Insert Table 9 Here]
7 Conclusion
We have found that for Thai ﬁrms, the presence of close ties with banks and politicians – often
referred to as ‘cronyism’ – was by far the most important factor in determining access to long
term debt prior to the Asian Crisis of 1997-98, to the almost complete disregard of standard
ﬁrm characteristics. While Thailand provides perhaps the best laboratory for the testing of
the cronyism hypothesis in the shadow of the crisis, we are inclined to believe similar results
might be found in many other emerging economies.
In the wake of the crisis it is easy to implicate such practices. And probably with good
cause. However, it is perhaps meaningful to ask why such practices existed in the ﬁrst place, and
whether they played a role in insulating and facilitating these economies during their earlier
periods of rapid growth. It is useful to juxtapose these ideas with the recent arguments of
Diamond and Rajan (2000c) on banks, short-term debt and ﬁnancial fragility. They argue that
countries with poor disclosure rules and inadequate investor protection will be expected to have
limited long-term debt capacity. Consequently they are forced to rely excessively on short-
term debt, which in turn causes them to be ﬁnancially fragile and prone to crises. Could then
soft-budget constraints and associated crony practices serve a useful purpose at a low level of
institutional (under)development and become obsolete as the economy develops further? This
seems to be an important question needing further research.
27References
Anuchitworawong, Chaiyasit, Toshiyuki Soma, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2002, Fam-
ily ownership of ﬁnancial institutions: Thailand during the pre and post crisis, mimeo.
Barclay, Michael J., and Cliﬀord W. Smith, 1995, The marturity structure of corporate
debt, Journal of Finance 40, 609–631.
Berglof, Erik, and Gerard Roland, 1998, Soft budget constraints and banking in transition
economies, Journal of Comparative Economics 26, 18–40.
Bongini, Paola, Stijn Claessens, and Giovanni Ferri, 2000, The political economy of distress
in East Asian ﬁnancial institutions, Working paper 2265, World Bank, Washington DC.
Brooker-Group, 2002, Thai Business Groups 2001: A Unique Guide to Who Owns What
(The Brooker Group Plc, Bangkok, Thailand).
Bualek, Pannee, 2000, The analysis on the major owners of Thai banks during 1932-1973
(Siam Publisher, Bangkok, Thailand), second edition, in Thai.
Chui, Andy, Sheridan Titman, and K.J. Wei, 2000, Corporate groups, ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion and growth: The case of Indonesia, memio.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, 1998a, What caused the asian
currency and ﬁnancial crisis? Part I: A macroeconomic overview, Working paper 6833,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, 1998b, What caused the Asian
currency and ﬁnancial crisis? Part II: The policy debate, Working paper 6834, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Asli, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 1999, Institutions, ﬁnancial markets, and
the ﬁrm debt maturity, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 295–336.
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Eric Maskin, 1995, Credit and eﬃciency in centralized and
decentralized economies, Review of Economic Studies 62, 541–555.
Diamond, Douglas W., 1991a, Debt maturity and liquidity risk, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 106, 709–737.
Diamond, Douglas W., 1991b, Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans
and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99, 689–721.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000, Banks, short term debt and ﬁnancial
crises: Theroy, policy implications and applications, mimeo.
Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the value of political connections, American Economic
Review 91, 1095–1102.
Hewison, Kevin, 1989, Bankers and bureaucrats: Capital and the Role of the State in
Thailand (Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, CT).
Houston, Joel, and Christopher James, 1996, Bank information monopolies and the mix of
private and oublic debt claims, Journal of Finance , 1863–1889.
Joh, Sung Wook, 2002, Corporate governance and proﬁtability: Evidence from Korea before
the economic crisis, Journal of Financial Economics , forthcoming.
Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, Corporate gov-
ernance in the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141–186.
Johnson, Simon, and Todd Mitton, 2001, Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from
Malaysia, Working paper 8521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA.
28Johnston, Barry R., 1991, Distressed ﬁnancial institutions in thailand: Structural weak-
nesses, support operations, and economic consequences.
Khanna, Tarun, 2000, Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing
evidence and unanswered questions, European Economic Review 44, 748–761.
Kroszner, Randell S., and Philip E. Strahan, 2001a, Bankers on boards: Monitoring, con-
ﬂicts of interest and lender liability, Journal of Financial Economics , 415–452.
Kroszner, Randell S., and Philip E. Strahan, 2001b, Throwing good money after bad?
Board connnections and conﬂicts in bank lending, Working paper 8694, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Krugman, Paul, 1998, What happened to Asia?, memio.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Guille rmo Zamarripa, 2003, Related
lending, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, forthcoming.
Laeven, Luc, 2001, Insider lending and bank ownership: The case of Russia, Journal of
Comparative Economics 29, 207–229.
Laird, John, 2000, Money Politics, Globalisation, and Crisis (Graham Brash Pte Ltd,
Singapore).
Lee, Jong-Wha, Yound Soo Lee, and Byung-Sun Lee, 1999, The determination of cor-
porate debt in korea, Disscusion Paper No. 718, Harvard Institute for International
Development.
Manager Information Services, 1996, Listed Companies Hand Book 1996 (Eastern Printing,
Bangkok, Thailand).
Mitchell, Jenet, 1997, Strategic creditor passivity, regulation and bank bailouts, Disussion
paper 1780, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.
Morck, Randall, David A. Strangeland, and Bernard Yeung, 1998, Inherited wealth, cor-
porate control and economic growth: The Canadian disease?, Working paper 6814,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Nation Multi Media Group, 1997, The Nation.
Nukul, Prochuabmoh, 1998, Analysis and Evaluation of Facts behind Thailand’s Economic
Crisis (Nation Multimedia Group, Bangkok, Thailand).
Pomerleano, Michael, 1998, The East Asia crisis and corporate ﬁnances: The untold micro
story, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Washington, D.C.
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and outsiders: The choice between relationship and
arms-length debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367–1400.
Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1997, The Stock Market in Thailand 1997.
Stohs, Mark H., and David C. Mauer, 1996, The determinants of corporate debt maturity
structure, Journal of Business 69, 279–312.
Suehiro, Akira, 2000, The data and analysis of Thai large corporatations: State owned
companies, multinational companies and business groups, Mimeo, Institute of Social
Science, University of Tokyo, in Japanese.
Thanapornpun, Rangsun, 1999, Financial Crisis and Financial Sector in the Thai Econ-
omy, volume second (Kopfai Publishing Project, Bangkok, Thailand), in Thai.
Weinstein, David, and Yishay Yafeh, 1998, Costs of a bank-centered ﬁnancial system,
Journal of Finance 53, 635–671.
Wesaratchajakit, Worawut, 2002, The future of deposit insurance system in Thailand, Bank
of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin 42, 53–59.
29Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2001a, Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evi-
dence from Thailand, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 9, 323–362.
Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2001b, The equity ownership structure of Thai ﬁrms, Working
paper, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi
University, Tokyo, Japan.
30Table 1: The Thai Financial System
The information of this table is obtained from the Bank of Thailand. Panel A presents non
performing loans held by each category of ﬁnancial institutions. Panel B presents the number
of ﬁnancial institutions over the period of 1996-2001. Non performing loans and the number of
ﬁnancial institutions are measured at the end of each year. Non performing loan is a loan that
has stopped payment on principal and interest for at least 3 months. Financial institutions are
classiﬁed by the ownership following the deﬁnition of the Bank of Thailand. They include both
publicly and non publicly traded ﬁnancial institutions.
Panel A: Non performing loans
Financial Institution 1997 1998 1999 2000
1. Total commercial banks 19.77 45.02 38.57 17.70
1.1 Private banks (domestic) 19.36 40.48 30.59 18.00
1.2 State owned Banks 29.33 62.45 62.84 21.63
1.3 Foreign banks 1.87 9.81 9.94 6.60
2. Finance companies 33.28 70.16 49.22 24.48
Panel B: Number of ﬁnancial institutions during 1996-2000
Financial Institution 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Domestic private banks 14 14 9 9 9 9
State owned banks 1 1 4 4 4 4
Foreign banks 14 14 13 20 20 17
Finance companies 91 35 36 21 20 20
Total 120 64 62 54 53 50
31Table 2: Sample Description
This table presents characteristics of 270 companies in the sample. The sample consists of
non-ﬁnancial companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996. Accounting data is
for consolidated companies, obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
Panel A: Companies in the sample, classiﬁed by industries
Industry No. of companies
Agribusiness 28
Building materials 29
Chemicals and plastics 11
Commerce 12
Communication 10
Electrical products and computer 9
Electrical components 5
Energy 5
Entertainment and recreation 6
Food and beverages 20
Health care services 12
Hotel and travel services 9
Household goods 5
Machinery and equipment 5
Packaging 16
Printing and publishing 9
Property development 29
Pulp and paper 5
Textile 20
Transportation 6
Vehicles and parts 8
Others 11
Total 270
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Mean Median Max Min
Book value of total assets 7,140.71 2,428.76 179,785 325.81
Sales 3,531.52 1,544.03 107,273.01 11.31
Market value of equity 4,485.53 926.94 118,930.5 47.20
M-B ratio 1.175 0.975 4.940 0.250
Fixed asset ratio 0.419 0.388 0.935 0.011
Number of years incorporated 21.02 17 120 2
Note: Values are in million Baht.
32Table 3: Sample Frequency Distribution on Firm with Connections
This table provides the frequency distribution of the sample with respect to ﬁrm-bank con-
nections. The Percentage column presents the percentage of ﬁrms with one speciﬁc type of
connection to total number of ﬁrms in the sample. The number of ﬁrms in the sample is 270.
Type of the ﬁrm-bank connections Frequency Percentage
I. Connections with the inﬂuential families
1. Firms with the connections 96 35.56
1.1 Families that own ﬁnancial institutions 31 11.48
1.2 Families that do not own ﬁnancial institutions 65 24.07
2. Firms with no connection 174 64.44
II. Board connections with ﬁnancial institutions
1. Firms with the connections 187 69.26
1.1 Executive level 13 4.81
1.2 Non executive level 98 36.30
1.3 Both executive and non executive levels 76 28.15
2. Firms with no connection 83 30.74
33Table 4: Financing and Firm characteristics: Connected to Inﬂuential Families
This table presents mean and median values for a set of ﬁrm characteristics, as measured in
1996. The data includes 96 and 174 ﬁrms that are connected and not connected to the country’s
most inﬂuential families, respectively. S-T loans is short term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance
companies. L-T loans is long term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance companies. S-T portion
of L-T debt is long term debt that is due in this period. Total debt is the summation of S-
T bank loans, L-T bank loans, S-T portion of L-T debt and debentures. EBIT/total assets
and EBIT/sales are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets and sales,
respectively. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed asset
ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D.(sales) is the S.D. of the percentage
changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. Sale growth is the average annual growth in sales
over the period 1992-96. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Total assets and
sales are in million Baht. Mean and median diﬀerences are tested using the t-test and the
Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
when compared with connected ﬁrms at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Mean Median
Connect Not connect Connect Not connect
Financing Structure
Total liabilities/total assets 0.566 0.539 0.596 0.561
total debt/total assets 0.398 0.411 0.425 0.437
S-T loan/total assets 0.175 0.247¤¤¤ 0.142 0.222¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total assets 0.043 0.035 0.028 0.021
Debentures/ Total assets 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000
Long-term loans / Total assets 0.157 0.107¤¤¤ 0.122 0.069¤¤
Trade credit/total assets 0.083 0.066¤ 0.063 0.048¤
Debt maturity structure
S-T loan/total debt 0.505 0.629¤¤¤ 0.484 0.687¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total debt 0.101 0.08 0.076 0.053
Debentures/total debt 0.046 0.042 0.000 0.000
L-T loans / Total debt 0.347 0.248¤¤¤ 0.294 0.173¤¤
Firm characteristics
Total assets 13,605.2 3,574.01¤¤¤ 4,886.8 1,902.9¤¤¤
Sales 6,222.1 2,047¤¤¤ 2,617.8 1,265.8¤¤¤
EBIT/assets 0.048 0.040 0.042 0.045
EBIT/sale 0.062 0.035 0.069 0.065
M-B ratio 1.183 1.171 0.962 0.985
Fixed asset ratio 0.409 0.425 0.369 0.402
Cash/asset 0.015 0.028¤¤ 0.007 0.014¤¤¤
Liquid asset ratio 0.428 0.462 0.418 0.476
Sale growth 0.340 0.248¤ 0.136 0.181
S.D (sale 1991-1995) 0.486 0.334¤ 0.155 0.182
Age 24.250 19.236¤¤ 18.500 16.500¤¤
34Table 5: Financial and Firm Characteristics: Board Connections
This table presents mean and median values for a set of ﬁrm characteristics, as measured in
1996. The data includes 187 ﬁrms that have at least one board member has a seat on the
board of a bank, and 83 ﬁrms that have no such connection. S-T loans is short term borrowing
from banks and ﬁnance companies. L-T loans is long term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance
companies. S-T portion of L-T debt is long term debt that is due in this period. Total debt
is the summation of S-T bank loans, L-T bank loans, S-T portion of L-T debt and debentures.
EBIT/total assets and EBIT/sales are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets and sales, respectively. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total
assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D.(sales) is the S.D.
of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. Sale growth is the average annual
growth in sales over the period 1992-96. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Total
assets and sales are in million Baht. Mean and median diﬀerences are tested using the t-test and
the Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
when compared with connected ﬁrms at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Mean Median
Connect Not connect Connect Not connect
Financial characteristics
Total liabilities/total assets 0.554 0.536 0.580 0.563
Total debt/total assets 0.405 0.409 0.433 0.428
S-T loans/total assets 0.201 0.266¤¤¤ 0.167 0.262¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total assets 0.039 0.033 0.025 0.018¤
Debentures/ Total assets 0.027 0.015 0.000 0.000
L-T loans / Total assets 0.138 0.095¤¤ 0.106 0.061¤¤
Trade credit/total assets 0.071 0.074 0.045 0.056
Debt maturity structure
S-T loans/total debt 0.544 0.677¤¤¤ 0.578 0.760¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total debt 0.095 0.071¤ 0.067 0.043¤¤
Debentures/total debt 0.048 0.032 0.000 0.000
L-T loans / Total debt 0.312 0.22¤¤ 0.28 0.41¤¤
Firm characteristics
Total assets 9,192.3 2,517.8¤¤¤ 3,381.8 1,512.7¤¤¤
Sales 4,261.6 1,886.7¤¤ 1,758.7 1,209.3¤¤¤
EBIT/total assets 0.046 0.036 0.042 0.048
EBIT/sale 0.048 0.037 0.070 0.062
M-B ratio 1.190 1.140 0.973 0.977
Fixed asset ratio 0.406 0.449 0.367 0.422¤
Cash/asset 0.021 0.029¤ 0.009 0.017¤¤¤
Liquid asset ratio 0.443 0.466 0.456 0.462
Sale growth 0.305 0.226 0.162 0.166
S.D. (sale 1991-95) 0.434 0.284¤ 0.175 0.152
Age 21.107 20.819 17 17
35Table 6: Inﬂuential Familiy Regression
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is long-term loans divided by total debt. Connected to inﬂuential families indicates if the ﬁrm
is owned by one of the 60 largest business groups. Inﬂuential families with banks indicates if the
ﬁrm’s major shareholder also owns at least one ﬁnancial institution. Inﬂuential families without
banks indicates if the ﬁrm’s major shareholder does not own a ﬁnancial institution. M-B ratio
is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of
net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales
over the period 1991-1995. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set
of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Conneted with inﬂuential families 0.0780¤¤
(0.035)
Inﬂuential families with banks 0.068
(0.053)
Inﬂuential families without banks 0.083¤¤
(0.040)
Log (asset) 0.058¤¤¤ 0.059¤¤¤
(0.015) (0.015)
M-B ratio -0.005 -0.006
(0.023) (0.023)
Fixed asset ratio 0.281¤¤ 0.282¤¤
(0.112) (0.113)
Total liabilities /asset 0.023 0.023
(0.097) (0.097)





Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.356 0.357
N 270 270
36Table 7: The Interaction between Crony Variable: Inﬂuential Familiy Regression
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent
variable is long-term loans divided by total debt. Inﬂuential family indicates if the ﬁrm belongs
to one of the 60 largest business groups. Inﬂuential family with banks and Inﬂuential families
without banks indicate if the ﬁrm’s major shareholder also owns, and does not own at least one
ﬁnancial institution, respectively. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of
total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 91-95)
is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. In column (1), (2),
and (3), the ﬁrm characteristics are interacted with Inﬂuential family, Inﬂuential family with
banks, and Inﬂuential family without banks, respectively. The regression method is the OLS.
Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable Inﬂuential family With banks Without banks
(1) (2) (3)
Crony * Log (asset) 0.002 -0.019 0.010
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
Crony * M-B ratio 0.016 -0.265¤¤¤ 0.049
(0.049) (0.092) (0.052)
Crony * Fixed asset ratio -0.343¤¤ -0.159 -0.349¤
(0.151) (0.181) (0.183)
Crony * Total liabilities /asset 0.253 0.825¤¤ 0.035
(0.221) (0.327) (0.244)
Crony * S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.035 0.087 -0.012
(0.041) (0.080) (0.045)
Log (asset) 0.058¤¤¤ 0.059¤¤¤ 0.060¤¤¤
(0.022) (0.018) (0.017)
M-B ratio -0.007 0.006 -0.020
(0.028) (0.024) (0.028)
Fixed asset ratio 0.405¤¤¤ 0.281¤¤ 0.374¤¤¤
(0.135) (0.117) (0.125)
Total liabilities /asset -0.019 -0.031 0.031
(0.108) (0.098) (0.110)




Inﬂuential family with banks 0.208 0.058
(0.416) (0.054)
Inﬂuential family without banks 0.088 ** -0.005
(0.040) (0.481)
Intercept -0.785¤¤ -0.755¤¤¤ -0.813¤¤¤
(0.323) (0.261) (0.244)
F-statistic 6.530 6.53 6.560
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.00 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.375 0.389 0.372
N 270 270 270
37Table 8: Board Connection Regression
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is long-term loans divided by total debt. Board connections indicates whether there exits at
least one member from the board of banks in the ﬁrm board. Bankers as executives and Bankers
as non executives are dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if there exits at least one member
from the board of banks acting as top executive and non executive of the ﬁrm, respectively. M-B
ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio
of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 92-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in
sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes
a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Board connections/Board size 0.215¤¤ 0.293¤¤¤
(0.109) (0.118)
At both executive and non executive levels 0.107¤¤¤ 0.129¤¤¤
(0.041) (0.045)
At executive level -0.006 0.012
(0.077) (0.082)
At non executive level 0.032 0.024
(0.034) (0.036)
Log (asset) 0.059¤¤¤ 0.050¤¤¤ 0.058¤¤¤ 0.049¤¤¤
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
M-B ratio -0.005 -0.002 0.008 0.013
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Fixed asset ratio 0.266¤¤ 0.304¤¤¤ 0.240¤¤ 0.285¤¤
(0.114) (0.108) (0.126) (0.118)
Total liabilities /asset 0.022 0.047 -0.017 0.003
(0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.100)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.016 -0.019 -0.021 -0.027
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Intercept -0.763¤¤¤ -0.677¤¤¤ -0.724¤¤¤ -0.645¤¤¤
(0.217) (0.222) (0.268) (0.265)
F-statistic 7.13 6.90 7.940 7.740
Prob (F-statistic) 0 0.00 0.000 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.351 0.362 0.365 0.358
N 270 270 234 234
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The estimation method is Probit. The coeﬃcients presented are the marginal eﬀects of a one
unit change from the mean of each independent variable on the probability of having a board
connection with banks. The independent variable is one if the ﬁrm has at least one member
from the board of banks acting as director or top executive of the ﬁrm, has at least one person
on its board sitting on those of banks in 1996, and zero otherwise. Mean of the dependent
variable is 0.69. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed
asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. Inﬂuential families with banks indicates
if the the ﬁrm belongs to one of the 60 largest business groups and its major shareholder also
owns at least one bank and ﬁnance company. Inﬂuential families without banks indicates if
the ﬁrm belongs to one of the 60 largest business groups and its major shareholder does not
own bank. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period
1991-1995. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry
dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ¤,
¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (asset) 0.163 ¤¤¤ 0.134 ¤¤¤ 0.170 ¤¤¤ 0.134 ¤¤¤ 0.172 ¤¤¤
(0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.042) (0.058)
M-B ratio 0.024 0.035 0.026 0.040 0.047
(0.051) (0.049) (0.045) (0.055) (0.052)
Fixed asset ratio -0.130 -0.126 -0.022 -0.126 -0.028
(0.168) (0.167) (0.147) (0.189) (0.171)
Total liabilities/asset -0.367 ¤ -0.280 -0.416 ¤¤ -0.267 -0.368 ¤
(0.212) (0.206) (0.206) (0.235) (0.227)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.049 0.043 0.022 0.062 0.024
(0.062) (0.068) (0.062) (0.081) (0.077)
Inﬂuential families without banks 0.266 ¤¤¤ 0.988 ¤¤¤ 0.318 ¤¤¤ 0.996 ¤¤¤
(0.053) (0.030) (0.065) (0.012)
Inﬂuential families with banks 0.277 ¤¤¤
(0.043)
Crony * Log (asset) -0.238 ¤¤¤ -0.238 ¤¤¤
(0.079) (0.087)
Crony * M-B ratio -0.052 -0.075
(0.110) (0.122)
Crony * Fixed asset ratio -0.156 -0.116
(0.341) (0.382)
Crony * Total liabilities /asset 0.516 0.390
(0.504) (0.550)
Crony * S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.996 1.004
(0.463) (0.519)
Prob > Chi-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R squared 0.150 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.23
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